Relational Solidarity and Climate Change by Doan, Michael D. & Sherwin, Susan
79© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 
C.C. Macpherson (ed.), Bioethical Insights into Values and Policy, 
Public Health Ethics Analysis 4, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-26167-6_6
 Chapter 6 
 Relational Solidarity and Climate 
Change in Western Nations 
 Michael  D.  Doan and  Susan  Sherwin 
 Abstract  The evidence is overwhelming that members of particularly wealthy and 
industry-owning segments of Western societies have much larger carbon footprints 
than most other humans, and thereby contribute far more than their “fair share” to 
the enormous problem of climate change. Nonetheless, in this paper we shall coun-
sel against a strategy focused primarily on blaming and shaming and propose, 
instead, a change in the ethical conversation about climate change. We recommend 
a shift in the ethical framework from a focus on the role of individual agents and a 
conversation about guilt; in its place, we propose a relational approach to public 
health ethics that is centered around the idea of relational solidarity. We begin by 
briefl y reviewing the most common—and woefully inadequate—approach in the 
West to reducing emissions and responding to the health-related impacts of climate 
change. We then go on to propose a relational approach to public health ethics as an 
alternative ethical framework that better fi ts the moral problems associated with 
climate change and holds promise for a more meaningful response. 
 Western nations  are  in an uncomfortable place when it comes to global discussions 
of climate change. It is well known and widely documented that industrialized 
Western nations have historically been among the highest emitters of industrial 
greenhouse gases, and have not done nearly enough to reduce those  emissions . In 
spite of numerous injunctions to stop worsening the  harms of climate change, the 
use of fossil fuels and chemicals continues to proceed without restriction in many 
parts of the West; indeed,  emission levels are continually on the rise (IPCC  2007 ). 
 The  evidence is overwhelming that members of particularly wealthy and industry- 
owning segments of Western societies have much larger carbon footprints than most 
other humans, and thereby contribute far more than their “fair share” to the enor-
mous problem of climate change. 
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 Clearly, there is ample reason to blame wealthy and industry-owning segments 
of the West for their disproportionate contributions to climate change and for their 
strong resistance to the kinds of changes required to signifi cantly reduce its adverse 
effects. Nonetheless, we shall counsel against a strategy focused primarily on blam-
ing and shaming and propose, instead, a change in the ethical conversation about 
climate change. We recommend a shift in the ethical framework from a focus on the 
role of individual agents and a conversation about guilt; in its place, we propose a 
relational approach to  public health ethics that is centered around the idea of rela-
tional solidarity. In Sect.  6.1 we shall briefl y review the most common—and woe-
fully inadequate—approach in the West to reducing  emissions . Then, in Sect.  6.2 
we shall propose a relational approach to  public health ethics as an alternative ethi-
cal framework that better fi ts the moral problems associated with run-away climate 
change in the West and holds promise for a more meaningful response. 
6.1  Climate-Related Policy, Ethics, and Bioethics in the West 
 The adverse effects of climate change are now familiar. They include unusually fre-
quent and intense weather events (heat waves, cold spells, “supercharged” storms), 
ecological disturbances (melting glaciers, rising sea levels,  fl oods ,  droughts , wild-
fi res), and pressures to modify traditional agricultural  practices . Each of these effects 
poses enormous threats to the lives and health of innumerable humans and countless 
other species. Because of the interrelated implications for population- level patterns of 
(water- and vector-borne)  disease and mortality; food and water security, sanitation, 
shelters and settlements; and migration (e.g., forced  displacements and relocations of 
peoples as “climate refugees”), climate change has been identifi ed as “ the biggest 
global health threat in the 21st century ” (Costello et al.  2009 , emphasis added). 
 The adverse effects of climate change are already intensifying the ecological and 
social  vulnerabilities of large portions of the world’s population, in many cases “pre-
cisely because they uphold ecological values that have not been engulfed by global 
capitalism and technological modernization” (Cuomo  2011 , 695). These devastating 
impacts are expected to continue to fall fi rst and most heavily on poor peoples and 
communities of color around the globe, especially women, children, the elderly, and 
people with disabilities living in impoverished urban areas, coastal regions, and other 
areas with severe air quality issues (Bullard  2008 ; Cuomo  2011 ; Shiva  2012 ; 
MacGregor  2014 ). Even in the industrialized West, poor communities face more 
urgent challenges from climate change than do those in wealthier and better serviced 
neighborhoods. Thus, feminist philosopher Chris Cuomo is quite  right when she 
stresses that, “climate change is a matter of global social  justice ” (Cuomo  2011 , 693). 
 Indeed, mitigating climate change is an enormously complex  political challenge 
in addition to an ethically and practically demanding one. Signifi cant changes in 
policies and  practices are required at all levels of human organization, from indi-
vidual citizens, through community groups, corporations, and reaching to local and 
national governments, as well as international bodies (Sherwin  2012 ). Yet, at 
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 present the area of greatest consensus and activity seems to be primarily at the level 
of individuals: citizens of industrialized nations are called upon to cultivate and 
exercise political agency in recognition of  responsibilities we share with others 
worldwide (Young  2011 ). Diffi cult public decisions urgently need to be made con-
cerning what and how much to produce and consume, and on what forms of energy 
to rely—decisions that have wide-ranging  consequences for the lives and liveli-
hoods of large numbers of differently located and situated peoples around the globe. 
Especially weighty claims have been pressed upon citizens of Western nations that 
have contributed the most to producing the industrial greenhouse effect over the last 
century and a half, and that continue along unsustainable pathways of resource 
extraction, production,  consumption , and waste. 
 While government and corporate agents in high-emitting Westerns nations per-
sistently refuse to acknowledge their roles in causing climate change, and decline to 
take responsibility for addressing the problem, people living in the West have been 
encouraged to accept the individualization of responsibility for addressing climate 
change, so much so that this particular division of labour is in many cases simply 
taken for granted (Maniates  2001 ; Cuomo  2011 ; Webb  2012 ; Doan  2014 ). Various 
environmentalist groups, businesses, and governments have been promoting the 
idea that changing light-bulbs, recycling more, riding bicycles, and planting trees 
are particularly effective ways of slowing the pace of climate change and transform-
ing into environmentally conscious citizens. The prevalence of these recommenda-
tions needs to be understood in the broader  context of neoliberal micro-economic 
 governance strategy in nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada. In response to the question of how best to strike a balance between the 
apparently contradictory requirements of  economic growth through resource- and 
energy-intensive  consumption on the one hand, and extensive reductions of  green-
house gas emissions on the other, the most consistent message is that each of us can 
help to mitigate climate change if we shift patterns of personal and household con-
sumption toward low-carbon alternatives and transform ourselves into “green con-
sumers” (Szasz  2011 ; Webb  2012 ). 
 Meanwhile, the operations of markets and large corporations, including major 
energy fi rms, have for all practical purposes been exempted from questions of gov-
ernment regulation and collective responsibility, leaving governments and citizens 
to shoulder the burdens of cleaning up air,  soil , and  water pollution and providing 
disaster assistance in the wake of severe storms, fl ooding, desertifi cation, and wild-
fi res. In effect, current techniques and processes of resource extraction and distribu-
tion (notably, the extraction of fossil fuels, such as oil, through offshore drilling and 
the surface mining of tar sands; coal, through depth mining and mountain-top 
removal; and natural gas, through hydraulic fracturing or “ fracking ”), existing rela-
tions of production and manufacturing, and corporate waste  practices have been left 
to the discretion of powerful decision-makers in private  industry , who are able to 
guide and respond to shifting market conditions under limited regulatory con-
straints. To the extent that these largely corporate controlled processes, relations, 
and practices are in any way subject to reorganization through collective decision- 
making processes involving the wider public, it is mainly through indirect, highly 
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individualized means: primarily via market mechanisms, where “consumer demand” 
is expressed as an aggregate of the everyday choices of consumers given the options 
made available for  consumption . And those indigenous peoples, environmentalists 
and others who publicly challenge the mitigation policies proposed by neoliberal 
politicians, or who engage in direct action campaigns to disrupt the resource extrac-
tion and distribution projects of energy fi rms, are routinely branded as “threats,” 
labeled “extremists” or “eco-terrorists,” and subjected to criminalization and intense 
surveillance (Shiva  2012 , 22). 
 In this way, the individualization of responsibility for addressing climate change 
leads to the privatization and depoliticization of crucially important areas of 
decision- making that affect the lives and livelihoods of billions (Swyngedouw 
 2010 ,  2011 ; Macgregor  2014 ). Control over the direction of resource extraction, 
production,  consumption , and waste is ceded to powerful decision-makers in pri-
vate  industry on the one hand, and to their market-mediated interactions with far 
less powerful consumers on the other. Concerns for equity and social  justice are 
effectively sidelined by this strategy for addressing climate change, for their expres-
sion is limited to the endorsement of particular goods, services, and companies 
through everyday commercial transactions.  Public deliberation and participation in 
collective decision-making processes are eschewed in favour of the injunction to 
“vote with your dollars,” regardless of whether “you” have very much money, and 
hence infl uence, to begin with. Even if the individualization of responsibility did 
not offer “limited and largely self-defeating means of transition to a sustainable 
society” (Webb  2012 , 121), it would still be an inadequate strategy for signifi cantly 
reducing  emissions . For as Cuomo points out, “Even if personal sphere reductions 
that can be directly controlled by individuals and households are ethically impera-
tive, they are insuffi cient for adequate mitigation,” seeing as how “household  con-
sumption and personal  transportation account for a signifi cant but minority slice of 
total  greenhouse gas emissions worldwide” (Cuomo  2011 , 701). 
 Despite the limitations individuals face in having an impact on climate change, 
questions of ethical and political responsibility for the excessive production and 
 consumption patterns of the West have come to focus primarily on the role of indi-
viduals, qua individuals. Just as the dominant trend in ethics and bioethics in the 
West has been preoccupied with concern over the moral  duties —or moral virtues—
of individual agents, the attention of theorists, activists, and ordinary citizens wor-
ried about climate change has been directed primarily to the actions and  practices of 
individual agents. Mainstream ethics and bioethics typically encourage environ-
mentalists to focus on individual agents and government agencies and to concern 
themselves with assigning blame and seeking reparations for wrongful behavior. It 
is true that many people, groups, and  institutions in the West are guilty of excessive 
contributions to climate change, but it is not often recognized that agents of various 
types at multiple levels of organization are not offered meaningful ways to signifi -
cantly reduce  emissions , and are not always well positioned to do so on their own 
initiative. Furthermore, talk of blame and guilt has had limited effects on actually 
changing policies and  practices . It is often ineffective in persuading those who are 
charged with wrongful behavior to make signifi cant changes, and it can suggest to 
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others who are “less guilty” that they do not need to make changes themselves, or 
at least not until the worst offenders are on board (a pattern that has unfortunately 
been mirrored during negotiations at the international level). 
 Hence, we suggest a different approach to the ethics of climate change, involving 
an alternative understanding of the role and character of ethics. We propose moving 
away from an exclusively backwards-looking, fi nger-pointing ethics of blame, which 
falsely imagines individuals making decisions and acting in isolation; in its place, 
we propose a shift towards a more forward-looking ethics of responsibility, which 
recognizes how tangled together all agents are in networks of highly interdependent 
 relationships , not to mention how changeable those relations and relationally consti-
tuted agents can be. We believe such an ethics will help us fi gure out how agents and 
agencies at multiple levels of human organization can coordinate their actions to 
make effective and wide-ranging changes in existing patterns of resource extraction, 
production,  consumption , and waste. It will do so, in part, by helping differently 
located and situated agents see the need to build trusting  relationships with one 
another while learning to work collaboratively for the protection and achievement of 
health-related  public goods (Young  2011 ; Sherwin  2012 ; Doan  2014 ). For this task, 
we shall propose a relational approach to  public health ethics—an approach that 
upholds the values of  relational autonomy , social  justice , and solidarity. 
6.2  Relational Public Health Ethics 
 As noted above,  climate change poses a major threat to public health. Hence, the 
ethical framework to appeal to in the West—and around the globe—should be one 
developed to address issues central to  public health . Public health ethics is an 
approach to ethics that recognizes the  collective  nature of public health and acknowl-
edges the limitations of bioethics strategies that were developed to deal with clinical 
care for individual patients and  research involving individual subjects. Whereas the 
primary focus of clinical bioethics is on individual patients and, often, individual 
providers, the principal concern of public health is with  populations , not individu-
als. At least in the case of  public health ethics , then, it is reasonable that we seek a 
more collective understanding of ethics which attends to the activities of agents and 
agencies of many levels of complexity (Baylis et al.  2008 ; Sherwin  2012 ). 
 There are various proposals relating to public health ethics available to us. The 
most thoroughly worked out is that offered by Madison Powers and Ruth Faden in 
their book,  Social  Justice : The Moral Foundations of Public Health and  Health Policy 
(Powers and Faden  2006 ). We are very sympathetic to their approach and share their 
commitment to placing social  justice at the very core of  public health . But we differ 
somewhat in our understanding of social justice and we do not agree that social justice 
alone constitutes “the foundational moral justifi cation for public health” (Powers and 
Faden  2006 , 81). We favor an explicitly  relational approach to  public health ethics 
that is centered on three important relational values:  autonomy , social  justice , and soli-
darity (Baylis et al.  2008 ). We shall speak very briefl y about relational approaches to 
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autonomy and social  justice and then turn to the matter of relational solidarity, which 
in our view holds the key to involving the wealthy industrialized West in responding 
to the demand of  public health ethics to address climate change. 
 The sort of relational theory we favor is rooted in an understanding of persons as 
 relational —that is, as constituted within specifi c historical, economic, social and 
political circumstances and through inter-relationships with other persons, both cho-
sen and unchosen. It is a theory that is particularly sensitive to ways in which mem-
bership in various groups defi ned along such categories as age, gender, (dis)ability, 
sexuality, race, nationality, and economic status are systematically associated with 
power and privilege or with disadvantage and oppression (Downie and Llewellyn 
 2012 ). Relational  public health ethics is, then, an approach to  public health ethics in 
which the core values of  autonomy , social  justice , and solidarity are understood 
from the perspective of a theory attentive to the relational  nature of persons. 
 Relational autonomy , like its more familiar cousin, traditional autonomy, is con-
cerned with the interests, values, and commitments of those who will be affected by 
policy decisions and related  practices . It differs, though, in asking us to be sensitive 
to ways in which members of oppressed groups are particularly vulnerable to hav-
ing their interests sacrifi ced in favor of those with greater power, and it demands 
that we be attentive to the value of  autonomy in responding to the resistance of the 
vulnerable to oppressive treatment. It also reminds us that not everyone is equally 
well situated with respect to the options and opportunities available to them when 
making choices. Hence, it is important in  public health to consider how differently 
located agents will be affected by various policy options. We also need to be sensi-
tive to ways in which those who are most seriously disadvantaged and oppressed 
may face fewer, and less acceptable, choices so that we can take action to ensure 
that there are meaningful options available for them to benefi t from  public health 
measures (Sherwin  2012 ). For example, when a severe storm is predicted for a spe-
cifi c geographical region and residents are advised to evacuate, we must ensure that 
public transit, safe shelter, and adequate medical care is provided to the poor, 
elderly, and disabled and avoid assuming that every citizen has access to private or 
public  transportation out of the danger zone (Pastor et al.  2006 ; Bullard  2008 ). 
 With regard to social  justice, we follow Iris Marion Young ( 1990 ) in understand-
ing relational social justice to be concerned not only with fair distribution of the 
material benefi ts and burdens of our social policies and  practices , but also with fair 
access to social goods such as  rights , opportunities, power, and self-respect as well 
as substantive participation (as opposed to merely formal representation) in collec-
tive decision-making processes. Powers and Faden make clear that human 
 well- being is itself an important social good (Powers and Faden  2006 , 15). In the 
 context of public health, they identify six essential dimensions of well-being: health, 
personal  security , reasoning, respect, attachment, and self-determination. We agree 
with them that public health policies and practices should strive to secure a suffi -
cient level of each of these dimensions for each individual. On our relational 
account, this requires that policy makers, and those charged with implementing 
public health  practices , be attuned to ways in which members of oppressed groups 
are at particular  risk with regard to each dimension, and recognize the need for 
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substantive participation in collective decision-making processes and policy adjust-
ments to bring all groups up to acceptable levels. In the  context of climate change, 
this surely requires that we fi nd ways of reducing the threats to life and health con-
fronting those living in impoverished nations and communities who are confronted 
with the most immediate and severe effects of climate change. 
 The value we think most useful in our discussion of the industrialized West is 
that of relational solidarity (Baylis et al.  2008 ). Solidarity is central to public health 
insofar as we humans have a shared interest in survival, safety, and  security , and 
climate change imperils the very survival of our species. Moreover, in many areas 
of public health, these interests can only be achieved or protected through the pur-
suit of  public goods , where a public good is understood to be a good “that is non- 
excludable … and, in pure form is non-rivalrous,” such as scientifi c knowledge and 
control of communicable diseases (Labonté and Schrecker  2007 , 4).  Public goods 
benefi t nearly everyone; hence, everyone is called upon to act in solidarity with one 
another in light of our having a shared interest in supporting their defense and pur-
suit. Because all humans will suffer severely if the pace of climate change is not 
immediately reduced, slowing climate change is undoubtedly a  public good . 
Moreover, the pace of climate change can only be effectively slowed if there is 
widespread commitment to the task and broad-based participation in the elaboration 
and enactment of long-term coordinated response strategies. We truly all are in this 
together, for every single person depends on the health of the  Earth ’s oceans, water-
ways, air, fl ora and fauna, not to mention the technical and social  infrastructure 
necessary for the continued survival and fl ourishing of human lives. Since serious 
degradation and destruction of any of these elements threatens everyone, solidarity 
is a pragmatically as well as ethically and politically important value when it comes 
to climate change and other threats to health-related  public goods . 
 We propose a distinctly relational understanding of solidarity—that is, an under-
standing that is sensitive to important differences in the power and privilege of vari-
ous individuals, groups, and  institutions , and to the signifi cance of these differences 
as experienced and (re)negotiated in efforts to work collaboratively for the protec-
tion and achievement of  public goods . In its Statement of Principles for  public health 
approaches to the control of pandemic fl u, The Bellagio Group emphasizes that  trust 
is an essential element for public health efforts: “public health efforts are more likely 
to succeed in an  atmosphere of social solidarity and trust, including the trust of dis-
advantaged people” (Bellagio Group  2007 ). Relational solidarity reminds us that not 
every human will be affected as early and severely as others; indeed, some commu-
nities and groups are already suffering profoundly from the adverse effects of cli-
mate change. Relational solidarity requires us to exercise concern for the needs of 
the disadvantaged and vulnerable and to contribute to building trusting  relationships 
while learning to work collaboratively. Thus, it encourages us to work out strategies 
of the sort that contrast starkly with the currently dominant, highly individualized, 
and evidently ineffective responses still favored in many parts of the West. 
 In helping us move away from the individualization of responsibility for address-
ing climate change, relational solidarity helps agents operating at multiple levels 
shift towards participation in genuinely  collaborative forms of collective action. 
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Consider some of the differences between a familiar threat to health-related  public 
goods , such as community (or “herd”) immunity, and those associated with the 
adverse effects of climate change. In the case of vaccination programs (e.g., the 
MMR and fl u vaccines) there is something that each citizen can do qua individual 
to help secure the  public good of community immunity—indeed, once certain con-
ditions are in place (e.g., the provision of vaccines by healthcare providers), indi-
viduals can each act separately, performing tasks that are identical for all (i.e., 
arranging for a vaccination). Thus, the relevant kind of collective action is  additive 
in  nature —the effects of each of our individualized actions add up, and we all end 
up benefi ting from the achievement of a  public good . 
 Although there is no way for people living in the West to immunize ourselves to 
the adverse health-related effects of climate change (e.g., increased prevalence and 
severity of respiratory illness due to more frequent and intense heat waves in urban 
areas), we can act collectively at and across multiple levels to reduce  risks and 
 harms to entire populations. When compared to the work of securing the  public 
good of community immunity, one important difference is that what each of us can 
do as individuals is clearly insuffi cient—the sum of our efforts to reduce private- 
sphere  emissions may well make a difference, but not one big enough to secure the 
health-related goods at issue. Hence, the kind of collective action required must be 
other than simply  additive in  nature ; further, it must also be other than the sort that 
aims to protect or achieve all  public goods directly. Instead, agents and agencies at 
multiple levels need to coordinate our actions to mitigate climate change while also 
preparing for its downstream effects—forms of collaborative action that are instru-
mental to, or that indirectly help to defend, health-related  public goods . 
 To coordinate our actions effectively, agents of various kinds need to get down 
to the hard work of sorting out the complex  interconnections of  responsibilities to 
be assigned and assumed and learn to work collaboratively in the process. Thus, in 
the  context of climate change a relational approach to  public health ethics encour-
ages us to make sense of how precisely “we are all in this together,” emphasizing 
that we truly need to be coming together, building trusting  relationships , and acting 
together to bring about dramatic shifts in existing patterns of resource extraction, 
production,  consumption , and waste. We simply cannot afford to be planning and 
acting separately when such important  public goods are at stake. 
 Finally, relational solidarity helps us to understand that some people, especially 
affl uent and industry-owning citizens of Western nations, have the luxury of being 
able to deny the realities of climate change (Norgaard  2011 ), or to engage in what 
are known to be woefully inadequate responses a bit longer (Doan  2014 ). Indeed, 
many of those with the most wealth seem to believe that they can evade the serious 
 consequences of climate change since they have not yet been seriously affected. 
However, these delusions cannot be maintained for much longer. Even industrial-
ized Western nations have experienced unusually frequent and powerful storms, 
devastating  droughts and wildfi res in some areas, and frightening  fl oods in others. 
In an increasingly interconnected global order, patterns of illness, disease,  displace-
ment , and migration tend to both presuppose the actions of physically distant agents 
and come to affect the lives and livelihoods of differently located and situated 
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groups in various, frequently unpredictable ways. Not everyone yet recognizes the 
need for solidarity with our fellow humans from all strata of our own societies and 
all those across the planet, but surely this need will become increasingly impossible 
to deny. 
 Relational solidarity provides an ethical basis for environmental activists and 
policy-makers to investigate ways of building trust and solidarity with the privileged 
and powerful as well as with the disadvantaged and oppressed. When considering 
responses to the  public health threats of climate change, we need to go even further 
than the Bellagio Principle by speaking to the importance of building trusting  rela-
tionships among communities, groups, and  institutions with varying kinds and 
degrees of privilege and power. Particularly wealthy and industry-owning segments 
of Western societies, too, need to be part of our emphasis in efforts to forge relations 
of solidarity. Indeed, relational solidarity must aim for inclusivity and resist the 
temptation to frame policies in terms of “us” versus “them” in light of the complex 
array of coordination problems that need to be explicitly addressed. We will need 
the skills, knowledge and resources of all sorts of persons, groups, and  institutions 
to devise and implement strategies that can signifi cantly slow the pace of climate 
change. As the rich and powerful come to appreciate the  public health threats of 
climate change, they can become powerful catalysts of collaboratively orchestrated 
change within and among the various organizations of which they are members: 
multi-national corporations, governments at all levels, communities, religious orga-
nizations, and so on. Since the structures of these organizations are also subject to 
change, working for broadly inclusive relations of trust and solidarity could well be 
crucial to ensuring that strides are taken in the direction of relational  social  justice. 
 Nevertheless, it is essential that those developing policies and  practices to slow 
the pace of climate change be attentive to the ways in which members of differently 
located and situated communities, groups, and  institutions can be expected to 
become  leaders in developing strategies for evading its most devastating  conse-
quences . As more and more people discover the need to foster broad-based solidar-
ity in responding to the  public health challenges of climate change, we hope that a 
relational approach to public  health ethics will be adopted. It will direct us to invoke 
the core values of  relational autonomy and social  justice , which will (hopefully) 
guide our long-term coordinated responses to this unprecedented threat to  public 
health . It will remind everyone to be particularly attentive to the  vulnerabilities and 
agency of the disadvantaged and powerless, and also attuned to the importance of 
including those with privilege and power. Relational solidarity can help us to 
approach our collective problems of climate change in accordance with the values 
of trust, collective responsibility, and accountability that are at the heart of relational 
public health ethics . 
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